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THE FIGHT AGAINST THE INSANITY DEFENSE: EXAMINING THE
LEGISLATIVE RATIONALE BEHIND THE MENS REA APPROACH
AND THE POTENTIAL LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF ITS USE

Brian Hauptman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the twenty-first century has been a period of
positive development when it comes to the treatment of mental
illness. 1 Regarding both actual psychological understanding and
societal awareness, great progress has been made in allowing
society to be more accommodating to the mental health
community. 2 Unfortunately, this general trend is not without
setbacks, especially when it comes to the complicated interactions
between mental illness and the criminal justice system. In
attempting to uphold justice and protect society as best as
possible, the criminal justice system has consistently had trouble
factoring in the potential impact of mental illness when it
considers whether an individual is culpable for wrongful actions.
Historically, the insanity defense and its subsequent adoption by
legislatures in all fifty states was an attempt to acknowledge and
address this shortcoming. 3 In this light, codifying the insanity

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law. I want to
thank my faculty advisor, Professor John Jacobi, for his continuous help and
feedback throughout the writing process. I also want to thank my family for their
constant support. Finally, I wish to express gratitude to my fellow students who
helped me shape this comment and make it the best it could be.
1
While studies have shown that society still has to improve many of its
approaches to mental health issues, a 2014 Harvard University study found some
areas of improvement since the 1990s. Particularly when it comes to treatment,
“greater public awareness, more effective diagnosis, less stigma, more screening
and outreach programs, and greater availability of medications,” have all
contributed to more positive outcomes overall. The Prevalence and Treatment of
Mental Illness Today, 22(5) HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER 4, 4–5 (Nov. 2005).
2 See id. at 5.
3
See Jessica Harrison, Idaho’s Abolition of the Insanity Defense—an
Ineffective, Costly, and Unconstitutional Eradication, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 580–85
405
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defense was a legislative means to offer mentally ill defendants an
opportunity to have a judge or jury consider the role that mental
illness may have played in the defendant’s alleged crime and
decide whether justice warranted a guilty verdict in light of that
consideration. 4
In recent decades, however, many legislators have
reevaluated whether this defense truly benefits society as a
whole. 5 Seemingly in response to concerns about the insanity
defense’s overall effectiveness in protecting society, a handful of
states across the country have sought to pull away from the
traditional method of accommodating mental illness. 6 Within the
four states that have so far taken this path, legislators have
enacted a series of statutes reforming the way mental health
evidence can be used at trial. 7 These states now allow for a
defense on the basis of mental illness only where the illness can
be shown to have precluded the defendant from forming the
state of mind required for their alleged crime—a formulation of
the insanity defense known as the “mens rea approach.” 8 If the
prosecution is nonetheless able to prove the required mens rea,
mental health evidence can then only be considered by a judge
after a guilty verdict is entered and sentencing proceedings have
(2015).
4 The insanity defense is sometimes considered a “justification” defense in that
it can lead a defendant to be found not guilty due to the influence of the mental
illness. This acquittal occurs even if the state has proven all elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All:

A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of “Abolishing” the Insanity
Defense, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1517 (2002).

Legislators on both the federal and state level have enacted various types of
reforms to address the perceived shortcomings of the insanity defense. These
reform efforts include changing evidentiary rules to prevent “ultimate issue” expert
testimony, shifting the burden of persuasion for the defense from the state to the
defendant, and the institution of the “Guilty But Mentally Ill” plea in which a
defendant’s mental illness is acknowledged but they are still subject to criminal
sanctions. Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity
Defense and Attempted Reforms: Evidence Toward Informed Policy, 23 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 375, 381–83 (1999).
6
Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 256 (1997).
7
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (Lexis 2019); IDAHO CODE § 18207(1) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Lexis 2020); Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.
Ct. 1021, 1025-26 (2020).
8 Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1519–21.
5

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

COMMENT

407

begun. 9
While the mens rea approach has only been adopted by four
states, this Comment will seek to examine the effects that its
adoption has had, and continues to have, on the many who suffer
from mental illness within those jurisdictions.
Instead of
discussing the legality or constitutionality of the approach, this
Comment will consider its effects and the underlying beliefs that
have led legislatures in Montana, Utah, Idaho, and Kansas to
move away from the traditional insanity defense. There is
evidence to suggest that the adoption of the mens rea approach
by these four legislatures has harmed mentally ill individuals by
both confirming mental health stereotypes and reforming the
criminal justice system in a manner that has put the mentally ill
at an even greater disadvantage. The overall goal of this
exploration is to further inform legislative debate in these four
states, and in any future state seeking to adopt the mens rea
approach.
The hope is that this Comment will provide
legislators with a better understanding of the potential
consequences involved with the mens rea approach.
Part II of this Comment will focus on the history of the
insanity defense leading up to the adoption of the mens rea
approach. It will explore how state legislatures originally viewed
the defense and how that view began to shift, resulting in the
mens rea reforms. Part II will also break down the individual
statutes that were ultimately enacted by the four states that
adopted the mens rea approach. Part III will examine the Kahler
v. Kansas 10 opinion and discuss the implications that arose from
the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of
the mens rea approach. Part IV will go into depth regarding the
individual views that justified these legislative reforms and
examine the evidence that supports or contradicts them. Part V
will examine how the mens rea approach puts these views into
practice and the consequences that are evidenced to have
resulted. Finally, Part VI will reiterate how the apparent reality
of these consequences should make legislatures cautious,
necessitating further consideration about whether reforms like
the mens rea approach are truly beneficial or whether they
9
10

See, e.g., Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1025-26 (2020).
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020).
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should be abandoned.
II.

LEGISLATIVE TREND

The significance of a defendant’s ability to understand the
morality of their actions has deep roots in the western legal
tradition. 11 Some of the first foundations of the insanity defense
come from accounts of thirteenth-century trial proceedings
where an English judge instructed a jury to consider the
defendant’s capacity to reason during their deliberations. 12
Initially, this defense was not used to prevent a guilty verdict and
instead involved a post-conviction plea for a royal pardon. 13 The
philosophy behind this was that mental illness can so severely
interfere with an individual’s ability to reason that they could not
be assigned the same moral blameworthiness, and therefore legal
fault, as someone who fully understood their actions. 14
It was this initial concern—that mental illness could
transform a traditional guilty verdict into an unjust outcome—
which led to the official creation of the M’Naghten test and
encouraged its adoption by legislatures in all fifty states. 15 Under
the M’Naghten test, an individual is not responsible for his or her
criminal actions if, due to a mental illness, the individual did not
know “the nature and quality of the act he or she committed,” or
he or she did not “know that the act was wrong.” 16 The widely
adopted M’Naghten test was the standard insanity defense used
across the country for over a century before states began
questioning its ability to properly achieve just outcomes. 17

11
Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental
Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 7,

13–14 (2007).
12
13

Id.
Id.; see also Harrison, supra note 3, at 580 (referring to a 1723 English court

holding that stated a defendant could only make use of a defense of insanity if he
was “totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as to not know what he is
doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast.”).
14 Harrison, supra note 3, at 579.
15 See Harrison, supra note 3, at 581–82.
16 Fradella, supra note 11, at 16–17.

17
From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley: A Brief History of the Insanity
Defense, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/

trial/history.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
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The shift toward new approaches to the insanity defense
began in the 1950s and 1960s with new tests being theorized and
debated upon by both state legislators and judges. 18 The first
widely adopted reform to the traditional defense was the Model
Penal Code Test (“ALI”). 19 Following the path of previous reform
efforts, the ALI construction was created to be less restrictive and
more accessible than the M’Naghten test. 20 This is because,
under the ALI standard, a defendant can be acquitted if, due to a
mental illness, they lacked “substantial capacity” to appreciate
the wrongfulness of their actions or they were unable to conform
their behavior to the law. 21 By 1998, almost half of state
legislatures either explicitly adopted or otherwise approved of
the ALI test as a replacement for the M’Naghten standard. 22
The ALI reform to the insanity defense was one of many
reform actions taken during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, in
which legislatures sought to further protect the civil rights of the
mentally ill. 23 Despite this trend toward more accessible policies,
legislators in other states began supporting more restrictive
efforts. 24 Instead of acting out of a belief that mentally ill
defendants needed more accommodations, some legislators
began acting out of a concern that the M’Naghten test was too

18

Id.

Borum & Fulero, supra note 5, at 377; see also From Daniel M’Naughten to
John Hinckley, supra note 17 (outlining that prior to the creation of the ALI
19

approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the M’Naghten
test in 1954, creating the Durham rule. This rule was an attempt to allow more
scientific evidence of mental illness to be considered, with the rule holding that “a
defendant could not be found criminally responsible ‘if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect.’”).
20 Borum & Fulero, supra note 5, at 377.
21 Since its creation, the ALI test has become the most widely adopted form of
the insanity defense outside of the M’Naghten test. Borum & Fulero, supra note 5,
at 377.
22 From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 17.
23
In addition to the more expansive test for the insanity defense, many state
legislatures also enacted statutes in response to judicial decisions regarding
indefinite confinement of mentally ill individuals. These state legislatures began
reforming their laws to provide for more protective procedures, like the periodic
reassessment of individuals confined to a mental health facility after being found
not guilty for reason of insanity. See From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley,
supra note 17.
24 From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 17.

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

410

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

[Vol. 46:2

permissive. 25
These legislators argued that the traditional
insanity defense posed a threat to the public because it allowed
individuals who should have been held accountable to reenter
society without facing punishment for their crime. 26
This increased focus on mental illness’ supposed threat to
public safety reflected similar shifts in thinking among segments
of the U.S. population, feeding legislative efforts to restrict how
and when the insanity defense could be used. 27 For example, in a
series of surveys conducted in Wyoming following the trial of
John Hinkley, “large segments of community residents (90%),
college students (94%), legislators (87%), police officers (91%),
state hospital aides (94%), state hospital professionals (54%), and
mental health center professionals (49%) agreed with the
statement: ‘Too many people escape responsibility for crimes by
pleading insanity.’” 28
Of these efforts to protect the public, many involved
relatively slight changes to the procedural uses of the insanity
defense. 29 This included Congress’ passage of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act, which amended the Federal Rules of
Evidence to prevent mental health experts from testifying as to
the “ultimate issue” as an expert witness. 30 In seventeen states,
25

From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 17.

Montana’s former Assistant Attorney General John Maynard justified his
state’s adoption of a mens rea reform in a prepared statement to the U.S. Senate by
including an anecdote of how a defendant went about faking insanity so they could
use the insanity defense and be released. This, along with concerns that defendants
were not being held accountable, are examples of the concerns that individuals
within the Montana state government had over the potential consequences of a less
restrictive insanity defense. See Insanity Defense in Federal Courts: Hearing on
26

H.R. 6783 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong 240–41 (1982) [hereinafter Statement of John

Maynard]. These concerns were also presented by other members of Congress
during debates regarding federal legislation introduced to restrict the insanity
defense. For example, former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese supported
abolishing the defense because it would “‘rid . . . the streets of some of the most
dangerous people that are out there, that are committing a disproportionate
number of crimes.’” Rosen, supra note 6, at 256.
27 Rosen, supra note 6, at 255–56.
28
Rosen, supra note 6, at 255–56 (citing Richard A. Pasewark et al., Opinions
About the Insanity Plea, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 63, 67 (1981)).
29 Borum & Fulero, supra note 5, at 380–82.
30
The ultimate issue rule prevents expert witnesses from explicitly testifying
“that a criminal defendant is or is not insane.” In the M’Naghten context, this
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this desire also led legislatures to shift the burden of persuasion
for the insanity defense from the prosecution to the defendant. 31
For other state legislatures, however, mere procedural changes
were not enough to protect the public and larger reforms were
undertaken. 32
Since 1975, thirteen state legislatures have adopted the
guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”) plea as an alternative to the
insanity defense. 33 GBMI was not a replacement for the previous
forms of the insanity defense, but it theoretically granted jurors
an alternative path to acknowledge a defendant’s mental illness
without necessarily providing an acquittal. 34 Proponents of GBMI
believed that it would preserve the overall purpose of the insanity
defense while allowing blameworthy defendants to receive prison
sentences instead of being directly released or civilly committed
following an acquittal. 35
The legislatures in four states, however, found the GBMI
verdict did not sufficiently address the supposed failings of the
traditional insanity defense or the threat that it posed to the
public. 36 Rather than adopting a GBMI option and otherwise
prohibition would allow an expert to testify about the defendant’s mental illness but
prevent them from directly stating that the defendant did not understand the
nature and quality of the act or did not know that the act was wrong. See Borum &
Fulero, supra note 5, at 381.
31 Borum & Fulero, supra note 5, at 381.
32 Borum & Fulero, supra note 5, at 382.
33 Borum & Fulero, supra note 5, at 382–83; see Fradella, supra note 11, at 28–
29.
34 Fradella, supra note 11, at 28–31.
35
In practice, very few defendants found guilty but mentally insane actually
received treatment, as most states did not guarantee that these individuals would be
handled differently from other guilty defendants. In many ways, it was the fact that
this defense did not produce outcomes that were significantly different from a
traditional guilty verdict that led to the GBMI plea not being widely accepted.
Fradella, supra note 11, at 28–31.
36
See INGO KEILITZ & JUNIUS FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS, 13–14 (1984) (quoting State Senator
Thomas E. Towe, a chief sponsor for Montana’s mens rea statue, and David H.
Leroy, former Idaho Attorney General, who explained that the purpose of their
states adopting the mens rea approach was to prevent criminals from going “scotfree,” and to remove a defense that engendered distrust among the populous). In
addition to the mens rea approach, Arizona adopted the guilty except insane
(“GEI”) approach which also replaced their traditional insanity defense. Under this
approach, a person who is found GEI is still legally guilty but they are exempt from
criminal punishment. For more information about the elements of this alternate
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maintaining the insanity defense, these legislatures enacted the
mens rea approach through a series of statutory reforms that
directly limited when any such defense could be used. 37 Under
the mens rea systems adopted by these states, mental health
evidence could only be introduced during a trial to contest the
mens rea element of the crime. 38 After a guilty verdict is reached,
the defendant can once again make use of mental health
evidence to influence judicial discretion during sentencing. 39
Using this structure, the legislatures in these states significantly
decreased the number of mentally ill individuals who could
successfully obtain an acquittal due to their condition. 40
In the four states that adopted the mens rea approach, and
particularly in Montana and Idaho, there is evidence to suggest
that the severe reduction in the use of the defense was the goal
that legislators had in mind when enacting the approach. 41
Officials in states that championed these reforms, like Idaho
Attorney General David H. Leroy, expressed beliefs that
restricting the defense would:
eliminate the average citizen’s frustration with the
complicated, cumbersome, obstructive, and
illogical process which the mental defense has
become in the courtrooms of modern America.
The spectacle of psychiatric battles, extended trial
costs in time and dollars, questionable verdicts, and
cynical comments by experts have highlighted the
construction, see Fradella, supra note 11, at 31–32.
37
See Rita D. Buitendorp, A Statutory Lesson from “Big Sky Country” on
Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 30 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 965, 982-89 (1996); see also
Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1515.
38
Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1521; see also, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14102 (Lexis 2019); IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305
(Lexis 2020); Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1037 (2020).
39 See Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1567.
40
Statistical information indicates that in the decades following Montana’s
adoption of the mens rea approach, only 1% of defendants were able to use the
defense to achieve an acquittal, making this defense much more restrictive than its
previous form of the insanity defense. See Buitendorp, supra note 37, at 988.
41
KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13–14; see also Statement of John
Maynard, supra note 26, at 235 (stating that there had been no successful uses of
the insanity defense since the adoption of the mens rea approach in a statement to
Congress praising and justifying the adoption of the reform).

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

COMMENT

413

“insanity” of the insanity defense. The result has
been that millions of law-abiding citizens have
acquired a disrespect for the practicality and
results obtained in our legal system. 42
Whether out of a concern for how the traditional insanity defense
had previously been applied or due to a view that psychological
experts and evidence did not belong in the criminal justice
system, these legislators acted to curtail the role of the insanity
defense to protect their citizenry. 43
As for Utah and Kansas, while there is little direct insight
into the motives behind legislators who supported these reforms,
evidence suggests that safety concerns regarding the accessibility
of the defense played a visible role in the debate regarding their
enactment. 44 For example, during Kansas’s legislative debates
over the mens rea approach, family members of victims killed by
defendants who were subsequently found not guilty for reasons of
insanity (“NGRI”) testified regarding the unreliability of
psychiatric testimony, which is central to the defense, as well as
the distrust that existed regarding the sincerity of the defense’s
use by defendants. 45 Even without knowing what particular
beliefs led to these statutory reforms, the continued use of this
approach by these legislatures is also notable. Whether or not
these legislators set out to reduce a defendant’s ability to acquit
42
KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13–14; see also Gilbert Geis & Robert
Meier, Abolition of the Insanity Plea in Idaho: A Case Study, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 74 (1985); see also Brief of the Idaho Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 11, Kahler v.
Kansas, 140 S. Ct. (2019) (No. 18-6135) (“To justify the decision to abolish the
defense, Montana relies on the claim that abolition furthers ‘goals of protection of
society and education.’”).
43
See Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 74–75; see also Statement of John
Maynard, supra note 26, at 237-38.
44
While the Kansas legislators were not very forthcoming with their specific
beliefs regarding the defense, some have pointed to the series of bills that were
proposed in the state legislature to restrict the use of the insanity defense leading
up to 1995, as well as the actual adoption of the mens rea approach, as evidence
that the state legislators either shared or were responding to the public’s anxiety
about the defense. Raymond L. Spring, Farewell to Insanity: A Return to Mens Rea,
66 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 38, 44–45 (1997).
45
See Brief for Lynn Denton et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 13–14, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020).
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themselves by introducing mental health evidence, at the very
least, it has been an acceptable side effect of the mens rea
approach’s continued use.
It should also be noted that the mens rea approaches taken
by these four states are not identical. Montana, the first state to
adopt the mens rea approach, removed the language in its
criminal statutes that provided the insanity defense as an
available affirmative defense. 46
In its place, the Montana
legislature added language that stated: “[e]vidence that the
defendant suffered from a mental disease or disorder or
developmental disability is admissible to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element
of the offense.” 47 This new statutory language, along with
reforms to Montana’s mens rea terminology that occurred
around the same time, requires defendants to present any mental
health evidence in the context of how it affected the knowingness
or purposefulness of the defendant’s actions. 48 Additionally, at
the defendant’s request following a guilty verdict, Montana’s
approach requires judges to evaluate whether they believe the
defendant suffered from a mental illness and to include that
consideration in sentencing decisions. 49
Unlike Montana, Idaho took a more straightforward
approach by passing a law that explicitly declared that “[m]ental
condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct.” 50 The Idaho statute goes on to clarify that this
restriction does not apply to the defendant’s use of mental health
evidence to negate a crime’s mens rea element. 51 The Idaho state
legislature also amended its sentencing guidelines, similar to
See Buitendorp, supra note 37, at 984.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (Lexis 2019).
48
Critics of this approach argue that even if defendants are allowed to use
mental health evidence to inform mens rea it is largely ineffective because mental
health evidence cannot easily fit into a discussion of whether someone acted
purposefully or knowingly. They suggest that in a potential case where a defendant
attacked a victim due to voices in their head telling them to kill, such evidence
would not necessarily lead to acquittal because, regardless of the influence that
imaginary voices had on the defendant, the actions could still be considered
purposeful. See Buitendorp, supra note 37, at 984–89.
49 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (Lexis 2021).
50 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (West 2021).
46
47

51

Id.
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Montana, to allow judges to consider evidence of a mental
condition during sentencing. 52 Furthermore, Idaho added a
provision in their sentencing procedures that empowers judges to
authorize the mental health treatment of a defendant during the
period of confinement if: (1) there is clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant had a diagnosable mental illness; (2)
the defendant would deteriorate without treatment; and (3)
treatment is available. 53
After Idaho, Utah was the third state to enact similar reforms
in 1984. 54 Similar to Montana and Idaho, Utah adopted an
approach in which evidence of mental health is only permissible
to show that the defendant lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged. 55 Unlike Montana and Idaho,
however, Utah only allows the admission of mental health
evidence when a defendant argues for mitigation of a penalty in
capital felony cases or special mitigation of the degree of a
criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide charge. 56
These new restrictions effectively limit the ability to introduce
mental health evidence to “a very narrow class of extremely
mentally ill defendants.” 57
The final state to replace a traditional insanity defense with
the mens rea approach was Kansas, whose legislature put such a
system in place in 1995. 58 Similar to Utah, Kansas achieved this
52
53
54

55
56
57

Id. at § 19-2523.
Id.

State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah 1995)
When John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity
for shooting President Ronald Reagan and Press Secretary James
Brady, public outrage prompted Congress and some states to
reexamine their respective insanity defense laws. As a result, in
1983 Utah abolished the traditional insanity defense in favor of a
new statutory scheme.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Lexis 2021).

Id.
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 363.

58
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In 1994,
Arizona made a major amendment to their insanity defense, but instead of
adopting the mens rea approach, Arizona removed the M’Naghten prong that
considered the ability to form the requisite intent and allowed the use of the
defense when, due to mental illness, a defendant is unable to understand that the
criminal action was wrong. See ARIZ. REV. STATE. ANN. § 13-502 (2009); see also
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748–49 (2006).
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reform almost entirely with a single statute that asserts, “[i]t shall
be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the
culpable mental state required as an element of the crime
charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.” 59
The Kansas statute limits defendants to argue only that their
mental illness prevented them from forming the necessary mens
rea element, leaving defendants with no other method for which
mental illness can produce an acquittal. 60 This effectively funnels
almost all evidence of mental illness to the sentencing stage of a
trial, preventing the majority of this evidence from being
considered until after an individual has been convicted. 61 This
forces the defendant to rely on judicial discretion regarding how
that evidence will be used. 62 It is also this specific Kansas statute
that was under review when the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state’s ability to make use of the mens rea
approach in Kahler v. Kansas .63
III.

KAHLER V. KANSAS

The Kahler case arose from a tragic incident that occurred
on Thanksgiving weekend in 2009 when James Kahler entered
the home of his ex-wife’s grandmother with several rifles and
killed his ex-wife, her grandmother, and his two teenage
daughters. 64
Kahler allegedly had a history of obsessivecompulsive personality disorder, major depressive disorder, and
narcissistic personality disorder, all of which required Kahler to
maintain a rigid routine. 65 After Kahler’s wife filed for divorce
and moved out of their home with their three children, Kahler’s
routine was disrupted, causing him to lose his job as his mental
state reportedly deteriorated. 66 He became obsessed with the
KAN. STATE. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2021).
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1026.
61 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020)
(No. 18-6135).
59
60

62
63
64
65

See id.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037.
Id. at 1027.
Eric Roytman, Kahler v. Kansas: The End Of The Insanity Defense?, 15

DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 45 (2020).
66

Id.
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idea that his ex-wife and two daughters were the sole cause of his
failures. 67 The murders occurred after Kahler’s ex-wife insisted
that their son spend Thanksgiving weekend at her grandmother’s
home, refusing Kahler’s request for his son to stay with him an
extra day. 68 Following the killings, Kahler surrendered to the
police and was charged with capital murder. 69
Before his initial trial, Kahler filed a motion arguing Kansas’
restrictive approach to the insanity defense violates his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 Kahler
argued that due process requires states to acquit a defendant who
could prove to a jury that they were unable to “tell the difference
between right and wrong.” 71 The trial court denied this motion,
allowing Kahler only to present evidence that his depression
prevented him from forming the necessary intent for murder. 72
After finding Kahler guilty of committing multiple murders, the
jury further deliberated on whether to impose the death penalty,
and ultimately sentenced Kahler to death for his crimes. 73
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court upheld
Kahler’s conviction as well as the Kansas law. 74 It found that
historic legal tradition did not suggest that a particular form of
the insanity defense had become “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 75 In
reaching the conclusion that the insanity defense and its scope
are not part of the national legal tradition, the Court pointed to
the existence of multiple tests for establishing legal insanity and a
perceived lack of consensus among the psychological and
medical community regarding those tests. 76 This has since
opened the door for states to accept whatever form of the
insanity defense they believe will offer the best balance between
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 46.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037.
Id. at 1027, 1038.
Id. at 1037 (“Across both time and place, doctors and scientists have held

many competing ideas about mental illness.”).
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public safety and justice, while also allowing for the possibility of
even more restrictive reforms in the future.
The Court also noted that it did not believe the mens rea
reforms enacted by Kansas and the other three legislatures
constituted an abolition of the insanity defense. 77 By allowing
evidence of mental illness to be considered during the
determination of competency before a trial, during the
determination of mens rea at trial, and during the sentencing
phase after trial, the Court believed that Kansas was simply
shifting when mental health evidence could be considered. 78 In
interpreting the challenged law in this manner and ultimately
upholding it, the Court also affirmed what it interpreted as the
traditional role of states in defining their criminal defenses. 79
With this affirmation, it is now even more important that state
legislatures carefully separate truths regarding mentally ill
individuals from stereotypes, placing the responsibility for
deciding whether to provide or deny the use of this crucial
defense primarily in the hands of state legislators.

77
78

See id. at 1031–32.
Id. at 1026 (expressing a view that this approach is equivalent to full

acquittal because the judge still has the discretion to sentence a defendant to
treatment in a mental health facility rather than prison if they deem it
appropriate); see id. (“In that way, a defendant in Kansas lacking, say, moral
capacity may wind up in the same kind of institution as a like defendant in a State
that would bar his conviction.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Kahler
v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135) (asserting that Kahler had every
opportunity and incentive to introduce expert testimony about his mental illness at
the punishment phase of his trial); but see Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie,
Abolition of the Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 488, 493 (2013) (stating that the use of mental health evidence at sentencing is
not the equivalent of a full insanity defense because sentencing occurs after blame
has already been asserted, and sentencing is discretionary which means that there is
nothing preventing mental health evidence from being an aggravating factor rather
than a mitigating factor).
79 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1047–48
[S]ometimes the law attempts to maintain this balance by
developing and retaining a “collection of interlocking and
overlapping concepts,” including defenses, that will help “assess
the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds.”
. . . As we have recognized, the “process of adjustment” within
and among these overlapping legal concepts “has always been
thought to be the province of the States.”
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Additionally, the Supreme Court’s reasoning also appeared
to accept, or at the very least failed to address, many of the
underlying beliefs and assumptions that have been raised in the
legislative debates over the mens rea approach. 80 This can be
seen most clearly in some of the questions asked during oral
arguments. 81
Specifically, Justice Alito expressed various
concerns surrounding the consequences of using diagnoses from
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM”) to define mental illness under an insanity defense. 82
Relying on the estimate that upwards of twenty percent of the
U.S. population could be diagnosable under the DSM, Justice
Alito feared that allowing anyone with such a disorder to assert
the insanity defense would lead to overuse. 83 Whether or not this
would be the case, by framing his fear in this manner, Justice
Alito is reflecting the view that defendants will take any
opportunity to exploit the defense and undermine the criminal
justice system as a result. 84 Justice Alito’s concern can be
interpreted as a dismissal of the idea that a mental health expert
could make an accurate evaluation of a defendant’s capacity to
reason, independent of a DSM diagnosis. 85 Furthermore, this is
the same general concern that led some legislators to support the
adoption of the mens rea approach in the first place. 86
80 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–12, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021
(2020) (No. 18-6135) (expressing concern that a more liberal interpretation of what
constitutes insanity and mental health evidence could potentially lead to an
explosion in the usage of the insanity defense); see also Rosen, supra note 6, at 256
(“According to former Attorney General William French Smith, ‘There must be an
end to the doctrine that allows so many persons to commit crimes of violence, to
use confusing procedures to their own advantage and then have the door opened
for them to return to the society they victimized.’”).
81
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021
(2020) (No. 18-6135).
82
83
84
85

See id.
See id.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 10–11 (dismissing Kahler’s attorney’s response, indicating that this

concern is somewhat unfounded, as an evaluation of a mental health expert in an
insanity defense case focuses on the defendant’s capacity to reason independent of
a DSM diagnosis). Justice Alito seems to disregard the idea that a mental health
expert would be able to look beyond that diagnosis and accurately determine
whether someone actually has the mental incapacity that the insanity defense is
meant to protect. See id.
86 See KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13–14; see also Insanity Defense in
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLITION

In moving forward with this analysis of the insanity defense,
it is important to understand the major arguments that have
arisen in legislative debates regarding the mens rea approach.
Now that the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of
this approach, more focus needs to be given to the consequences
of the continued and possible expanded use of the mens rea
approach. Specifically, it is important to explore what arguments
may have arisen to justify legislative acceptance of the mens rea
approach and whether those arguments have merit. The most
common arguments made against the insanity defense are the
beliefs that: the unreliability of mental illness evidence will taint
the criminal justice system; defendants often fake mental illnesses
to make use of the defense; the insanity defense is useless because
insane defendants are untreatable and should be exiled from
society; and the insanity defense poses a danger to the public
because it allows the release of dangerous individuals from
prison. 87
A. Evidence of Mental Illness Will Taint the Criminal

Justice System

Taken from the most high-profile uses of the insanity
defense, members of the public and some legislators, like former
Idaho Attorney General David H. Leroy, have come to believe
that the process of using the insanity defense is “complicated,
cumbersome, obstructive and illogical.” 88
Others, like one
Federal Courts: Hearing on H.R. 6783 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on
Crim. Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 463 (1982) (statements of

Mike Greely, Att’y Gen. of Montana)
The science of psychiatry embodies a complex set of ideas that
seem to preclude a courtroom consensus on the issue of insanity.
Psychiatrists and psychologists themselves are often affected in
their findings by their personal philosophies as much as they are
by measurable data. They often become advocates in a
courtroom, disputing even the widely accepted fundamental
principles upon which their science rests.
87
Rosen, supra note 6, at 258 (“With regard to mental illness, people believe
that psychiatric testimony is unreliable given that defendants can and do pretend to
have a mental disease or defect.”).
88
KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13 (quoting former Idaho Attorney
General David H. Leroy).
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respondent of a study that surveyed various opinions of Idaho
legislators, have expressed a belief that the insanity defense has
become so distorted that “the plea had become ‘laughable.’” 89 To
these legislators, the insanity defense is less of a way to achieve
just outcomes and more of an opportunity for psychological
officials to make what one Montana State legislator, Michael
Keedy, referred to as “arbitrary and God-like determinations”
that have no place in a courtroom. 90
For the most part, mental health evidence is seen as
inherently subjective, and the courtroom battle of psychological
experts is seen as a confusing spectacle that makes the evidence
less trustworthy. 91 The “battle of the experts” concept refers to
the belief that psychiatric experts rarely agree at trial and that
successful use of this defense simply requires defendants to pay
for a more convincing expert than the opposition. 92 Further
supporting this is a belief that “if psychiatrists are paid enough,
they will say anything about a defendant’s sanity.” 93 By viewing
the insanity defense through this lens, it becomes a legal
loophole that can only be leveraged by defendants wealthy
enough to hire experts with impressive credentials. 94 As a legal
loophole, rather than an objective defense, the insanity defense
undermines the supposed objectivity and equality of the criminal
justice system. 95 As Montana’s Assistant Attorney General John
Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 79.
Jeanne Matthews Bender, After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity
Defense in Montana, 45 MONT. L. REV. 133, 137 (1984); see also KEILITZ & FULTON,
supra note 36, at 13–14.
91
Rosen, supra note 6, at 259–60; see also, Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 75
(quoting an assertion from Idaho’s solicitor general stating that the central flaw of
the insanity defense was “its scientific unreliability”); Alexander D. Brooks, The
Merits of Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
125, 128 (1985) (“These illnesses now include disorders that may have significance
for psychiatric treatments or research, but that tend to be misleading for use by the
law as a basis for excusing offenders from responsibility for crime.”).
92 See Brooks, supra note 91, at 130.
93
Scott K. Elmore, The Insanity Defense: Public Opinion and the Public’s
Tendency to Implicate Mental Illness in High-Profile Crimes 54 (2015) (PsyD
dissertation, Alliant International University, Irvine) (ProQuest).
94 Rosen, supra note 6, at 258.
95
Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1551 (noting that Montana State Legislator
Michael Keedy cited a fear that the defense was perverting the criminal justice
system as his motivation for introducing the legislation that served to enact
Montana’s mens rea system).
89
90
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Maynard stated when defending Montana’s reform efforts in
front of Congress:
To modify the insanity defense is not to take a
step backward, but rather to understand
more about the limits of psychiatry. We know
now that juries
understand
accountability;
their
determinations
of
accountability
should not be undermined or confused by
“experts” who do not share a consensus about
the fundamental theories they employ.96
In addition to the battle of the experts, proponents of
abolition and the mens rea approach also believe that the very
nature of psychological evidence makes it antithetical to the
criminal justice process. 97 Seemingly, this is because of the
amorphous and subjective nature of mental disorders. 98 Mental
illness is often impossible to see on the surface, which means that
judges and juries are unable to see evidence of it for themselves
and have to trust the evaluation of a mental health expert. 99 This
creates problems because not only do members of the public have
skepticism regarding the competence of such experts, but
legislators also do not seem to trust juries to decide whether the
testimony provided by those experts should be believed. 100 This
distrust serves to inject uncertainty into a criminal justice system
that is reliant on societal confidence in its ability to achieve just

Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26, at 241.
See Brooks, supra note 91, at 128 (“These illnesses now include disorders
that may have significance for psychiatric treatments or research, but that tend to
be misleading for use by the law as a basis for excusing offenders from
responsibility for crime.”); see also Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26,
at 237–41.
98
Utah Legislative Survey—1983, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 115, 158 (1984)
(“Focusing on the issue of intent will eliminate much of the mystique and confusion
created by the inexact science of behavioral psychology.”).
99
Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The
96
97

Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1408 (1997).
100
Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26, at 237; see also Bender, supra
note 90, at 137 n.30.
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outcomes. 101
To the credit of these legislators, the concerns regarding the
way the public perceives psychiatric experts and mental health
evidence are not without merit. 102 Studies suggest that there has
been a growing sense of distrust in the reliability of the insanity
defense and the testimony of mental health experts. 103
Unfortunately, it appears that legislators in these states have
accepted these views without questioning the underlying
assumptions feeding this distrust. For example, Montana’s
former Attorney General has previously asserted his belief that
“[p]sychiatrists and psychologists themselves are often affected in
their findings by their personal philosophies as much as they are
by measurable data.” 104 Contrary to this belief, however, forensic
evaluations made by psychological experts generally do not rely
on their intuition and subjective beliefs. 105
More often, such evaluations involve personality,
neuropsychological, and intelligence testing to determine the
capacity of the defendant to properly reason between right and
wrong. 106
Additionally, despite its occurrence in some of the more
high-profile insanity defense cases, the battle of the experts is
neither as contentious nor as common as many would believe. 107
In most states, prosecutors usually do not contest the assertion of
the insanity defense by a defendant. 108 In the rare cases that they
101
See Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 74; see also Utah Legislative Survey—
1983, supra note 98, at 154.
102 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 258.
103
See Rosen, supra note 6, at 258 (“With regard to mental illness, people

believe that psychiatric testimony is unreliable given that defendants can and do
pretend to have a mental disease or defect.”).
104 Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26, at 237.
105
While not commonly used in every forensic psychological evaluation, the
use of more objective forensic instruments is widespread enough to be considered
the norm, and it is believed that this usage will continue to become more common
as graduate programs train students in their use. It should, however, still be noted
that as of 1999, certain groups, like psychiatrists, used these tests much less than
other evaluators. See Jocelyn A. Lymburner & Ronald Roesch, The Insanity
Defense: Five Years of Research (1993–1997), 22 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 213,
219–20 (1999).
106 Lymburner & Roesch, supra note 105, at 220.
107 Rosen, supra note 6, at 260.
108 Rosen, supra note 6, at 260 (“[P]rosecutors agreed to insanity in [ninety-two
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do, research suggests that the disagreement primarily occurs
when the attorneys argue over whether the legal definition has
been met with the mental health experts generally agreeing in
their psychological evaluations. 109 Even if this were the case,
however, one would have to ask why this disagreement between
psychiatric experts inspires such distrust when legislators are not
raising similar concerns about conflicting testimony provided by
doctors or other expert witnesses.
B. Defendants Commonly Fake the Insanity Defense
A second belief, and one that has been repeatedly referenced
by legislators and other politicians, is the idea that many
defendants who attempt to use the insanity defense are faking
insanity to escape personal responsibility. 110 Many detractors of
the insanity defense rely on this argument because they believe
that there are no real consequences that would prevent a sane
defendant from attempting to claim insanity. 111 The fear of
widespread faking is also supported by the aforementioned fact
that mental illness often has no visible symptoms and can only be
proven by psychological evaluation. 112 This lack of observable
proof, along with distrust directed at psychiatric experts,
supports the idea that sane individuals constantly raise the
insanity defense with at least a few of them ultimately succeeding
percent] of all the cases in which [the insanity defense] was raised.”).
109 Rosen, supra note 6, at 260; see also Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and
the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 5, 12 (1996) (“On the average, there is examiner agreement in
[eighty-eight] percent of all insanity cases.”).
110
See, e.g., Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26; Rosen, supra note 6,
at 256; Perlin, supra note 99, at 1407 (“The fear that defendants will ‘beat the rap’
through fakery, a millennium-old fear which has its roots in a general disbelief in
mental illness, and a deep-seated distrust of manipulative criminal defense lawyers
invested with the ability to dupe jurors into accepting spurious expert testimony.”);
Gina Aki & Ronald Craig, Exploring the Relationship Between Knowledge of the
Insanity Defense and Popular Media, 31 SOCIO. VIEWPOINTS 61, 62 (2017) (noting
that among the common themes presented in the popular show Law & Order was
the use of mental illness as an escape from personal responsibility).
111
See Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World, supra note 109, at 12;
see also Aki & Craig, supra note 110, at 62 (finding evidence that a lack of
portrayals in crime-themed programming regarding the consequences of an NGRI
plea may have led to a belief that there is no risk to the use of the insanity defense).
112 Perlin, supra note 99, at 1408.
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in their gambit. 113 This conclusion is then further reinforced
within the minds of some legislators due to anecdotal evidence,
like that provided by the aforementioned John Maynard who
supported the necessity of Montana’s reform by describing a
defendant who was found mentally ill during an evaluation but
was later discovered to possess “a note that listed detailed
instructions on how to convince a psychiatrist that ‘they were
crazy.’” 114
Despite these concerns, however, evidence suggests that
feigned insanity has never really been a common occurrence in
any state or with any form of the insanity defense. 115 Studies have
indicated that mental health experts who use appropriate
diagnostic tools can accurately determine if an individual is
faking a mental illness. 116 Studies also suggest that, rather than
defendants being able to feign insanity during mental health
examinations, over two-thirds of insanity pleas are dropped
because those experts make findings inconsistent with successful
insanity defense pleas. 117 This indicates that the instances of
psychological experts being tricked by sane defendants may be
the exception rather than the rule, calling into question the dire
nature of the insanity defense’s supposed threat to public safety.
Another key point to take note of is that there are definite
consequences for attempting an insanity defense, which likely
prevents many individuals from faking insanity in the first
place. 118 The most straightforward of these consequences is that a
person asserting the insanity defense is subject to two
113
Elmore, supra note 93, at 54; see also Rosen, supra note 6, at 256
(“Congressman John Myers [from Indiana] contended that the defense provided a
'safe harbor' for criminals who bamboozle a jury into thinking they should not be
held responsible.”).
114 See Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26, at 240 (sharing an anecdote
of an instance where a defendant had been found with a note that contained
detailed instructions on how to convince a psychiatrist that one had a mental
illness).
115 Perlin, supra note 99, at 1409.
116 Whether due to improvements in psychological testing or flaws found in the
studies that originally cast doubt on the abilities of mental health experts, recent
studies indicate that psychologists are accurate in their evaluations. See Perlin,
supra note 99, at 1410.
117 Lymburner & Roesch, supra note 105, at 226.
118 See Perlin, supra note 99, at 1412.

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

426

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

[Vol. 46:2

stigmatizing labels; in the eyes of the public, these defendants are
viewed as both insane and criminal. 119 The stigmatizing effect
that those labels can have on a defendant leads many people,
including some defendants with legitimate mental illnesses that
could mitigate their culpability, to avoid raising the insanity
defense when it is available. 120
Additionally, defendants who raise the insanity defense but
fail to meet its evidentiary burden suffer further negative
effects. 121 On average, research suggests that defendants who
raised the insanity defense but were ultimately found guilty
served longer sentences than defendants facing similar charges
who did not seek the defense. 122 Overall, this evidence conflicts
with legislative assertions and casts doubt regarding what some
politicians, like former United States Attorney General William
French Smith, have called,
[a] doctrine that allows so many persons to commit
crimes of violence, to use confusing procedures to
their own advantage and then have the door
opened for them to return to the society they
victimized. 123

119
See Michelle Leigh West, Triple Stigma in Forensic Psychiatric Patients:
Mental Illness, Race, and Criminality 27 (2015) (Ph.D dissertation, City University
of New York); see also Sareen K. Armani, Coexisting Definitions of Mental Illness:
Legal, Medical, and Layperson Understandings Paving A Path For Jury Bias, 26 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 213, 224 (2017) (“[N]egative usages of the word ‘insane’
have become negatively associated with the word itself, so that in the courtroom,
the mere utterance of the words ‘legally insane’ primes a web of other negative
words and thoughts in the juror’ minds.”).
120
Perlin, supra note 99, at 1412 (“[I]t is much more likely that seriously
mentally disabled criminal defendants will feign sanity in an effort not to be seen as
mentally ill, even where such evidence might serve as powerful mitigating evidence
in death penalty cases.”).
121 Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World, supra note 109, at 12.
122 Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World, supra note 109, at 12.
123 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 256; see also Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 75
(citing responses to a questionnaire distributed to legislators in Idaho).
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C. The Insanity Defense Releases Dangerous Individuals

Back into the Public

A third belief, and perhaps the one that has been most
frequently referenced in legislative debates, is the idea that the
insanity defense threatens the public by allowing dangerous
individuals to avoid prison and rejoin society where they can
cause further harm. 124 The public, however, overestimates how
often the defense is raised and its overall success rate,
underestimates how quickly those found NGRI are released, and
incorrectly distrusts the ability of medical professionals to
accurately determine whether individuals pose a danger to
themselves or others. 125
Just like the other major beliefs, empirical data calls into
question this view of the insanity defense as a revolving door for
dangerous criminals. 126 For one, people heavily overestimate the
use of the defense, with some studies indicating that “[t]he
public’s estimate is actually [forty-one] times greater than the
actual plea rate of 0.9%.” 127 This low usage is further exemplified
by the fact that the actual success rate of the defense is relatively
low as well. 128 Even more, defendants who are found NGRI are
often not released back into society as some would suggest. 129
States that allow the insanity defense have procedures for
See Rosen, supra note 6, at 256; see Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 79.
Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World, supra note 109, at 11–12;
see also Elmore, supra note 93, at 15.
126 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 258–59.
127 Elmore, supra note 93, at 53.
124
125

128
One study that examined eight states found that the average acquittal rate
was twenty-six percent. Elmore, supra note 93, at 53 (reporting findings from a
1994 study that showed participants’ estimates of insanity defense success rates were
eighty-one times greater than the actual success rate). It is important to note,
however, that the percentage was skewed by states like Washington, where the
success rate of the defense was eighty-seven percent because most insanity pleas
occurred with the consent of the prosecution. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume
and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334–35 (1991) [hereinafter Callahan et al., An EightState Study].
129
Morse & Bonnie, supra note 78, at 494; see also Perlin, Myths, Realities,
and the Political World, supra note 109, at 12 (“A comprehensive study of
California practice showed that only one percent of insanity acquitted defendants
were released following their NGRI verdict and that an additional four percent
were placed on conditional release, the remaining 95 percent being hospitalized.”).

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

428

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

[Vol. 46:2

individuals found NGRI to automatically face civil commitment
proceedings, which would send NGRI defendants to secure
mental health facilities instead of allowing them to immediately
reenter society. 130 Furthermore, civilly committed defendants, on
average, spend roughly the same or significantly more time in
mental health facilities than they would have otherwise spent in
prison. 131
Another key piece of the concern surrounding the danger
posed by the insanity defense is the distrust among legislators for
psychiatric experts. 132 Montana state legislator Michael Keedy, in
particular, noted the contribution that these beliefs made in his
support of restricting the insanity defense when he asserted that
psychological conclusions were “arbitrary and God-like
determinations.” 133 Distrust, like that exemplified by Keedy, is
somewhat understandable, as some historical studies indicate that
psychiatric experts are unable to accurately determine which
patients pose a danger to society. 134 However, after reanalyzing
these historical studies and conducting further research with
updated methodology, it has become clear that medical
professionals are more accurate at determining how dangerous
these patients are than many had previously believed. 135 As was
the case with the other major beliefs regarding the insanity
defense, this again calls into question the rationales used by
legislators to support the mens rea approach.
D. The Insanity Defense is Useless Because Insanity is

Untreatable

The last major belief that commonly underlies support for
the mens rea approach is the idea that a defendant’s goal of
seeking treatment rather than punishment for individuals with
mental illness is useless because treatment is largely ineffective. 136
Morse & Bonnie, supra note 78, at 494.
See Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World, supra note 109, at 12.
132
Statement of John Maynard, supra note 26, at 237; see also Bender, supra
note 90, at 137 n.30.
133 Bender, supra note 90, at 137.
134 Elmore, supra note 93, at 15.
135 Elmore, supra note 93, at 15.
136 See Armani, supra note 119, at 218; See also Colleen M. Berryessa, Judicial
130
131
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In general, this belief is supported by two views. The first view is
that the insanity defense provides defendants with incentives to
“stay sick,” which makes treatment less effective. 137 As previously
asserted by Montana State Senator Thomas Towe, who was a
chief sponsor for Montana’s mens rea reforms:
[A]llowing a person who has committed a
crime to go scot-free without any punishment for
his crime makes treatment for his underlying
mental illness more difficult. Instead of helping
him to understand the seriousness of his actions,
the insanity defense allows him to feel he is above
the law and ignore the gravity of his actions. This
makes his treatment more difficult.138
The second view is that mentally ill individuals are untreatable
and committing them to a mental health facility, where they may
be released sooner in comparison to prison, is an unnecessary
risk. 139 Both of these views culminate in the fear that defendants
who are released after civil confinement will re-offend because
the treatment they received will not have changed their
behavior. 140
Stereotyping Associated with Genetic Essentialist Biases Toward Mental Disorders
and Potential Negative Effects on Sentencing, 53 L. & SOC’Y REV. 202, 206 (2019).
137
Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World, supra note 109, at 14; see
also KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13.
138 KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13.
139 See Armani, supra note 119, at 218

[M]edia misrepresentations usually imply that those with mental
illnesses can never recover. They are often shown as static
characters, creating the impression that even with therapy, it is
impossible to get better. If they do get better, the extent to which
they are generally shown to recover is mere stabilization, rather
than full integration into society with jobs and a social circle.;
see also Bender, supra note 90, at 137 n.30 (noting that the sponsor of Montana’s
mens rea legislation subscribed to the belief that there was no such thing as mental
illness or psychiatric treatment).
140
This assumption underpins many statements made by politicians and is
likely supported by a belief that either they were not mentally insane in the first
place or the nature of the individual’s mental illness is such that they are just as
dangerous after having spent time in a psychiatric facility as they were going in, see
Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 79 (“Legislators also stressed that they were
concerned that dangerous offenders were being released from mental institutions
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Unfortunately, the belief that mental illness treatment is
ineffective has some truth to it, as treatability is affected by a selffulfilling prophecy. 141 When it comes to treating mental illnesses,
the process is highly susceptible to the individual’s own beliefs. 142
A defendant who is constantly told that their condition is
untreatable will likely have lower self-esteem and lower
healthcare utilization, leading to higher incidents of negative
treatment outcomes. 143 After all, a person who does not believe
they can improve will not see the point in taking full advantage of
the opportunities provided to them and, as a result, will not
receive the full benefits of those opportunities. 144 Perpetuating
this doubt, either through direct legislative approval or indirectly
through the continued support of the mens rea approach, has
consequences that legislatures need to acknowledge and take into
account when considering the mens rea approach in the future.145
V.

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF ABOLITION

In addition to considering the underlying beliefs behind
these reforms to the insanity defense and examining what
supporting efforts based on those beliefs might mean, it is also
important to consider the actual consequences of the new systems
that are being put into practice. In substantively changing their
insanity defenses to match the beliefs underpinning the mens rea
approach, these legislatures have created systems that themselves
act to strengthen the stigma against the mental health
community. In protecting the public from defendants who may
or may not be mentally ill, and in addressing the supposedly
destabilizing effect that mental health testimony has on the
without first having served the amount of time that would have been imposed on
them had they been deemed guilty of the criminal act.”); see also Rosen, supra note
6, at 256 (quoting former Massachusetts governor who, in arguing against the
insanity defense, said of defendants using the insanity defense, “Do you want
people who commit these terrible murders to be out in a year, two, three, walking
streets again?”). This again assumes that such individuals will either be directly
released back into society or receive treatment during those years and upon release
be just as likely to harm others as they were before.
141 Armani, supra note 119, at 221.
142 Armani, supra note 119, at 221.
143 Armani, supra note 119, at 221.
144 Armani, supra note 119, at 221.
145 Armani, supra note 119, at 221.
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criminal justice system, the mens rea approach has made it
almost impossible to introduce mental health evidence to avoid
guilt. 146 Furthermore, the mens rea approach has also made it
more likely that a mentally ill defendant will receive a more
restrictive sentence and will be subjected to worse treatment
outcomes through incarceration. 147
A. More People Are Found Guilty Under the Mens Rea

Approach

At its core, the mens rea approach has been a legislative
response to a belief that it is necessary to restrict how and when
mental health evidence should be introduced during a trial. 148 To
protect public safety, which is believed to be threatened by the
defense, state legislatures have effectively removed all but one
way in which mental health evidence could be used to avoid a
guilty verdict. 149 Once a trial has begun, the reformed systems
allow defendants only to present evidence of mental illness to
negate the intent requirement of a crime, which is very difficult
to successfully do. 150 This difficulty stems from the fact that using
See Lynnette S. Cobun, The Insanity Defense: Effects of Abolition
Unsupported by a Moral Consensus, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 471, 480–82 (1983).
147
See Berryessa, supra note 136; see also E. FULLER TORREY ET AL.,
146

TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN
PRISONS
AND
JAILS:
A
STATE
SURVEY
14–18
(2014),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatment-behindbars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf.
148
From Daniel M’Naughten to John Hinckley, supra note 17. Even without
testimony from Kansas state legislators, the fact that the adoption of the mens rea
approach was preceded by attempts to adopt other restrictive reforms to the
insanity defense indicates that such a restriction was at least one reason that the
legislature adopted the mens rea approach. See also Spring, supra note 44, at 45.
149
See Morse & Bonnie, supra note 78, at 491-93; See also Cobun, supra note
146, at 495
When mental illness is considered, it can affect the sentencing
disposition in two ways: it might justify a lesser sentence, or it
might suggest special treatment. A post-conviction imposition of
special treatment limits the state's options. Any special treatment
must be accorded within the criminal system-the choice of civil
commitment is no longer available. Moreover, the sentencer's
choice of disposition may be constricted by minimum prison
requirements, or even stipulated by determinate sentencing
statutes.
150 Morse & Bonnie, supra note 78, at 491.
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mental health evidence to suggest a defendant was incapable of
forming the requisite mental state of a crime is primarily effective
with specific intent crimes, but far less effective when the
requisite mens rea requirement is general intent or criminal
negligence. 151 This means that while the mens rea system now
used by these four states may be effective for defendants charged
with murder, it will be ineffective if a prosecutor decides to
downgrade the charge to negligent homicide, placing defendants
at a severe disadvantage. 152
For example, consider the hypothetical situation where a
defendant is charged with intentional homicide for shooting and
killing a person that the defendant firmly believed to be a bear. 153
Since intentional homicide requires the defendant to have acted
intentionally, the defendant may be able to successfully use the
mens rea approach to achieve an acquittal because he would be
able to argue that he did not intend to shoot a human being. 154
On the other hand, if the defendant’s charge is downgraded to
negligent homicide, the prosecution is required to prove that a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have been
aware that they were shooting a human being and any evidence
that the defendant suffered from a severe delusion would be
irrelevant. 155 From there, the defendant would be unable to
introduce evidence of mental illness to avoid conviction because
it would only be considered after the defendant was convicted
and the sentencing phase had begun. 156
The mens rea approach has made achieving acquittal, which
was already an uphill battle with the traditional form of the
defense, impossible for defendants with all but the most severe
mental illnesses and facing all but the most severe criminal
charges. 157 Studies conducted in the wake of Montana’s adoption
See Cobun, supra note 146, at 480-81.
Morse & Bonnie, supra note 78, at 492.
153 Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1524 n.51.
154 Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1524 n.51.
155 Nusbaum, supra note 4, at 1524 n.51.
156 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1026 (2020).
157 See Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Hidden Effects of Montana’s “Abolition” of
the Insanity Defense, 66 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 103, 107, 116 (1995) [hereinafter Callahan
et al., PSYCHIATRIC Q.] (comparing the thirty-eight NGRI verdicts during the three
years prior to the reform with six NGRI verdicts during the first six years following
151
152

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

COMMENT

2022]

433

of the mens rea approach show that while the number of
defendants who raised the insanity defense did not change
following the reform, the insanity defense’s success rate sharply
declined. 158 While this may have admittedly been the goal that
the legislature had in mind when enacting these reforms, the fact
that some of these individuals would have avoided a guilty verdict
and been provided treatment under the traditional insanity
defense cannot be ignored. 159
Furthermore, these studies also indicated an additional
“hidden outcome” of mens rea reforms by noting that, overall,
more mentally ill defendants were being released without
imprisonment or hospitalization. 160 The study hypothesized that
without a reliable method to recognize that a defendant’s mental
illness mitigated their culpability, more defendants were being
found incapable of standing trial (“IST”). 161 As civil commitment
proceedings were not statutorily required to commence following
an IST acquittal, more mentally ill defendants were ultimately
being released directly back into the general public. 162
B. Sentencing Under the Mens Rea Approach
In addition to affecting the success rate of the mental illness
defense, legislative beliefs also appear to have negatively affected
sentencing outcomes for mentally ill defendants in these four
states. 163
This is because legislators took much of the
responsibility for evaluating mental health evidence out of the
hands of jurors and shifted that responsibility to judges. 164 This
occurred out of a belief that jurors were unable to properly
evaluate the defense, allowing too many dangerous individuals to
be released without any punishment. 165 In making judges
the reform).
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

See id. at 116.
See id. at 115–16.
See id.
See id. at 116.
See id. at 116.
See Berryessa, supra note 136, at 205–06.
See Berryessa, supra note 136, at 205–06; see also Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.

Ct. 1021, 1031 (2020).
165
See Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 74; see also Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1031
(“[S]entencing is the appropriate place to consider mitigation: [t]he decisionmaker
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responsible for these evaluations, politicians, like former Idaho
Attorney General David Leroy, hoped that this “would remove
confusion from the courtroom as lay jurors try to determine the
very complex issues surrounding that determination.” 166
Unfortunately, research suggests that this shift has created a
problem because judges generally impose more restrictive
sentences in response to mental health evidence than they
otherwise would impose in cases where mental health evidence is
not introduced. 167 While not true for every case in every
jurisdiction, the overall trend regarding these harsher sentences
appears to exist and would only become increasingly prevalent in
a mens rea system that relies upon judicial evaluations. 168 These
more restrictive sentences are largely a result of judges holding
the same underlying beliefs that influenced legislators in
adopting the reforms; namely, that mentally ill defendants pose a
danger to society and that treatment is ineffective for such
individuals. 169 For example, in a survey examining judicial
there can make a nuanced evaluation of blame, rather than choose, as a trial jury
must, between all and nothing.”).
166
Geis & Meier, supra note 42, at 74; see also KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note
36, at 14 (quoting David Leroy who also stated that, if “[p]roperly understood, the
Idaho statute eliminates confusion, substitutes a simple and constitutional method
of determining guilt or innocence, moves the issue of a defendant's need for mental
treatment to the judge's discretion at sentencing, and better protects the rights of
society, the victim, and the defendant.”).
167 This conclusion is based on survey data collected from judges in an effort to
see how their sentencing processes are affected by perceptions of defendants. These
studies show that evidence of mental disorders can result in more restrictive
sentences due to a perception that such individuals are more dangerous. See
Berryessa, supra note 136, at 205–06 (citing Shayne Jones & Elizabeth Cauffman,

Juvenile Psychopathy and Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of an
Ethical Dilemma, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 151–165 (2008)).
168 Berryessa, supra note 136, at 206.
169
Shayne Jones & Elizabeth Cauffman, Juvenile Psychopathy and Judicial
Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of an Ethical Dilemma, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
151, 159 (2008)
The findings from the current study suggest that a hypothetical
defendant who is both labeled with psychopathy and ascribed as
possessing psychopathic traits is perceived as less amenable to
treatment and recommended for more restrictive placements
than a youth with no diagnosis. Also, an adolescent who is labeled
with psychopathy, described as possessing psychopathic traits, or
labeled and described as psychopathic is perceived by judges as
representing more of a danger to the community.;

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

COMMENT

435

stereotyping about mental illness, one judge responded to a
question about how a defendant’s mental disorder may affect the
judge’s sentencing consideration by asserting that:
There are some people that have a diminished
capacity [due to mental illness] . . . they are the
ones who’re getting to the most trouble and cause
the most problems in our community, and it’s not
entirely fair to lump them in the same category
with somebody who would consciously choose to do
an evil act. But on the practical side of things,
even if we shouldn’t say that they’re bad people, we
need to make sure that society is safe from them
because they are an increased danger. 170
As for treatability, this is linked to more restrictive sentences
because receiving treatment is viewed as going hand-in-hand with
a defendant’s ability to eventually become a safe and contributing
member of society. 171 In response to that same survey regarding
judicial stereotyping, a second judge stated that:
[i]t is what it is and I still would just look at the
danger to the community and the chance for . . .
medication and rehabilitation . . . protecting the
community is always of the utmost importance . . . .
It’s something that we use in considering whether
to release someone back into the community. 172
Evidence suggests that judges who believe that recovery is
unlikely are more willing to impose harsher prison sentences with
longer periods of confinement because judges may think to
themselves “nothing that I do in terms of treatment is going to
change their behavior.” 173 This is ultimately the same concern
expressed by legislators regarding their view of the insanity
see also KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 36, at 13–14.
170 Berryessa, supra note 136, at 220–21.
171 Berryessa, supra note 136, at 223.
172 Berryessa, supra note 136, at 223.
173 Berryessa, supra note 136, at 222.

HAUPTMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

436

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/18/2022 5:29 PM

[Vol. 46:2

defense as a fast track for mentally ill defendants to be released
back into society where they will cause further harm. 174
The fact that these are similar underlying beliefs is
important and cannot be ignored. While it has not been
concretely studied, it is reasonable to fear that these judicial
assumptions may be strengthened by legislatures providing these
views with a sense of authorization and acceptance through their
adoption of policies based upon them. After all, the accuracy of
these beliefs is being validated by their use in justifying a
reformation of the insanity defense. Whether this legislative
belief was explicitly accepted, in the case of Montana and Idaho,
or implicitly supported by states continuing to use and defend
the mens rea approach, the mere possibility of this effect should
warrant some caution.
C. Deepening Structural Stigma
While not directly caused by the changes enacted by these
state legislatures, it is also important to note that longer and
more frequent prison sentences, which may occur from the
reliance on judicial sentencing, are made even worse for
individuals with mental illness because of structural stigma within
the criminal justice system. 175 Structural stigma is a term that
refers to the inequities and injustices found within society and
institutions that restrict the freedoms of specific populations. 176
In the context of mental illness, structural stigma plays an
174

at 79.

See, Rosen, supra note 6, at 258–59; see also Geis & Meier, supra note 42,

175
See TRACY PUGH ET AL., COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CHANGING BEHAV. HEALTH
SOC. NORMS, STRUCTURAL STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS 6 (2015),
https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/dbassesite/documents/webpage/dbasse
_170045.pdf
Structural stigma is apparent in several areas related to the
criminal justice system, including laws and policing policies that
make [people with mental illness (“PMI”)] vulnerable to arrest;
the adjudication processes that PMI are less equipped to navigate
than people without [mental illness]; the lack of [mental health]
treatment services and support for PMI within the criminal
justice system; and the decreased likelihood PMI face in being
disentangled from the criminal justice system compared to
people without [mental illness].
176 Id. at 2.
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important role because of the way the criminal justice system was
designed. 177 Mentally ill individuals that find themselves within
the criminal justice system often struggle because it was neither
designed nor properly equipped to accommodate their
differences. 178
Individuals with mental illness generally serve longer
portions of their sentences than other prisoners because they are
less likely to be approved for parole and are more likely to break
prison rules, which prevents them from receiving sentence
reductions for good behavior. 179 Additionally, even when they
manage to follow the rules, mentally ill individuals are often
denied the opportunity for early release simply because many
community programs that supervise parolees do not want to be
responsible for them. 180 It is simply a reality that, on average, the
criminal justice system treats prisoners with mental illness more
harshly than those without. 181 These differences can then result
in harmful narratives when legislators use statistics, like the
increase in the average time served by mentally ill individuals,
without considering their proper context to support conclusions
such as the belief that the insanity defense should be removed so
that the state can “rid . . . the streets of some of the most
dangerous people that are out there, that are committing a
disproportionate number of crimes.”182
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the end, even though the issue of the mens rea approach’s
constitutionality has been largely settled by the Supreme Court,
further discussion of the mens rea approach is still warranted.
Beyond the question of whether state legislatures can adopt or
continue to support such reforms is the question of whether state
legislatures should adopt such reforms. While the insanity
177
178

Id. at 6.
Id.

179
TORREY ET AL., supra note 147, at 14; see also Virginia Aldigé Hiday &
Padraic J. Burns, Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, in HANDBOOK FOR
THE STUDY OF MENTAL HEALTH 478, 493 (Teresa L. Scheid & Tony N. Brown eds.
2d. 2010).
180 See Hiday & Burns, supra note 179, at 493.
181 See Hiday & Burns, supra note 179, at 490–93.
182 Rosen, supra note 6, at 256.
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defense may not be widely adopted, it is an extremely important
defense for those individuals who rely upon it. The insanity
defense is also in many ways a lightning rod that seems to draw
upon and further strengthen particular stigmas directed at the
mental health community. 183 By accepting a form of the insanity
defense that is heavily steeped in the perceptions that mental
illness is synonymous with dangerousness, that mental illness is
untreatable, and that mental illness is incompatible with criminal
justice, legislators are sending a message that they agree with
these views to both society as a whole and the mental health
community. 184
Even without considering these stigmatizing consequences,
at the very least there are enough indications that the claims used
to support these legislative efforts are flawed to warrant caution
and further study. 185 Until more detailed research can be
conducted to examine these apparent issues, state representatives
debating the insanity defense and other mental health issues
must consciously consider the effect that the aforementioned
assumptions and prejudices may have on their reasoning. Doing
this could prevent state legislators from unintentionally acting in
ways that would harm an already disadvantaged and politically
marginalized portion of the American public. 186

A study of eight states indicated that the insanity defense was raised in
approximately 0.93% of felony cases, see Callahan et al., An Eight-State Study,
supra note 128, at 334; see also Brief of 290 Criminal Law and Mental Health Law
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021
(2020) (No. 18-6135).
184 Rosen, supra note 6, at 256.
185
See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 6, at 262 (“By the time KAN. STAT. ANN. § 223220 was approved in 1995, Dr. Henry Steadman and Michael Perlin had already
published data that directly addressed and disproved the conventional wisdom
surrounding the insanity defense.”); Perlin, supra note 99, at 1382.
186 See West, supra note 119, at 78–79.
183

